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NOTE AND COMME NT
JmUsDIcTIoNAL FAcTs.-The advance sheets of the Northwestern Re-
porter for January 29th, igiS, contain two cases in which a supreme court
declared proceedings that had been carried through to judgment void, (not
merely voidable) because of the lack of a fact which the supreme court re-
garded as jurisdictional, (Sandusky Grain Co. v. Sanilac Circuit Judge
(Mich. ig15), iso N. W. 329 and Bombolis v. Minn. & St. L. R. Co. (Minn.
1914), i5o N. W. 385), and another case in which the court was equally di-
vided as to -whether the essential facts appeared (Fisher et al v. Gardnier
et al. (Mich. 1915), I5o N. W. 358). Of course, it was not suspected by
anyone when any of these cases was on trial in the first instance that there
was any question as to jurisdiction, nor was there doubt that the judgment
when rendered was valid and concluded the controversy; and in every one
of them, as in nearly all such cases, relief from any real hardship could
have been had by direct proceedings to vacate the objectionable judgment.
It is believed" that this particular weekly issue of the advance sheets is
by no means extraordinary, but rather typical. If there be any way of
avoiding this continuous miscarriage of justice that is bringing our courts
into common disrepute, and persuading people it is better to settle their differ-
ences elsewhere, it should be discovered and applied; and before accepting
it as a necessary evil we should be thoroughly satisfied that it is necessary.
If it be said. "let lawyers conform to the law;" the answer is that the law-
yers are not the greatest sufferers, nor does experience indicate that a rem-
edy is to be had by disregarding the prior proceeding on collateral attack.
Let us first see what facts are necessarily and admittedly jurisdictional;
and the result of the analysis may help us to see whether the evil has not in
considerable part come from holding facts to be jurisdictional which by their
nature are not so. It is believed that the following are the facts and the only
facts that are generally admitted to be jurisdictional, and the only facts that
are by the exigencies of the case required to be treated as jurisdictional. To
add to the list unnecessarily multiplies disaster without corresponding ad-
vantage. The list follows: (i) A court de facto (2) called to action in the
premises (3) by the parties affected on the one side, and (4) possession of
the thing affected, by seizure or its equivalent, and such indirect substituted
notice to all persons liable to be adversely affected by the judgment as is
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by its nature fairly calculated to reach them, warning them to appear and
defend. Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup. Ct. 410.
These four essentials are believed to complete the list of indispensible
facts to enable the court to proceed in rem. That the persons adversely af-
fected did not in fact get the notice is not a jurisdictional defect; but if
they do get it, appear, offer to defend, and are then refused a hearing, the
court is held to lose its jurisdiction. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274- If
the judgment is only to operate in personam jurisdiction of the thing by
seizure or its equivalent is not necessary. But if the judgment is to have
any validity in personam it is essential (5) that the court have jurisdiction
of the parties adversely affected, either by their voluntary appearance and
submission to the jurisdiction of the court, or by service of the court's pro-
cess on them, either in some manner which they have in advance agreed to
(as by giving a judgment note authorizing the payee to enter appearance for
the maker upon default), or by personal service upon them within the
court's territorial jurisdiction. No legislative enactment can dispense with
this requirement. Penno'yer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.
With these four or five essentials in mind, let us look at the recent de-
cisions above referred to, and first the case of Sandusky Grain Co. v. San-
ilac Circuit fudge (Mich.), I5O N. W. 329; in which the Supreme Court of
Michigan issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Sanilac circuit judge to
grant an injunction restraining the Detroit, Bay City and Western Railroad
Company from constructing a spur track down a street in' accordance with
a judgment of the probate court of the county in eminent domain proceed-
ings. The objection to the order of the probate court was that the probate
judge and the sheriff who made the jury list in that proceeding were stock-
holders of the company to whose plant the spur line was to be built. It will
be observed that this is not a collateral proceeding, but a suit instituted for
the sole purpose of vacating the objectionable order; and though appeal or
some other proceeding might be more direct, that is a matter of practice;
and ever since Lord Coxx failed in his desperate attempt as Chief Justice of
the King's Court to prevent the chancellor interfering with the court's busi-
ness by such restraining orders, it has been the common practice of courts
of chancery to restrain parties from proceeding under judgments obtained
in law courts under unconscionable circumstances. But in rendering the
judgment of the court in the recent case above referred to Mr. Justice
OSTRANDER said that the judgments of a disqualified judge are not voidable
merely but void. It would seem that the procedure adopted in this case
would be appropriate though the judgment were only voidable by reason of
the interest of the judge in the decision. If the judgment is void it cannot
be given any force by any length of acquiescence in it by both parties. The
fact that the.judge was disqualified would rarely appear on the face of the
proceedings and might not be discovered nor discoverable till many persons
had changed their position in reliance on the judgment and could not be re-
stored to statu quo. If a qualified judge is a jurisdictional element it is be-
cause this fact is essential to the first requisite of jurisdiction above enumer-
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ated. Certainly no judge should be permitted to dccide his own case, and
there are decisions to the effect that judgments rendered by an interested.
judge are not merely voidable but void. It is believed, however, that it
would be better to hold the parties bound by the judgment unless they had
it avoided by some proceeding instituted for the purpose as in this instance.
On principle, a disqualified, judge exercising the office is a judge de facto,.
to say the least, so that his acts should be valid so far as the public is con-
cerned; and the generally accepted view is that objection on account of the
disqualification of the judge can be taken only in the original proceeding
(Fowler v. Brooks, 64 N. H. 423, 13 AtI. 417, io Am. St. Rep. 425; Carr v.
Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N. E. 322, 1o Ann. Cas. 967; Jeffers v. Jeffers, 89 S. C.
244, 71 S. E. 8io; State v. Ross, ii8 Mo. 23, 23 S. W. I96; Race v. Reed, I38.
Ky. 6o5, 128 S. W. 89i) and it has even been held that after the trial has
commenced it is too late to make the objection on account of the disability
of the judge. Ex Parte Hilton, 64 S. C. 201, 41 S. R. 978, 92 Am. St. Rep..
Soo. The same logic that would render a judgment liable to collateral at-
tack because the judge was. disqualified would make it void if the jury was-
disqualified. If the judgment is void because something is done which the
law forbids, every erroneous judgment is void, and therefore every judg-
ment is void, for error can always be charged, and to try the question of
error or not is to re-try the case.
The second recent case above referred to is Bombolis v. Minneapolis &
St. L. Ry. Co. (Minn.), 15o N. W. 385; in which the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that the court below did not err in excluding from evidence
certified copies of proceedings in the probate court appointing a special ad-
ministrator, with whom defendant had made a settlement for the negligent
killing for which damages were claimed in this case. The ground on which
the exclusion was justified was that the statute providing for the appoint-
ment of administrators required that a petition for such appointment should
be made in writing specifying the essential facts, etc.; and the court founc
that no written petition was in fact filed, none being found in the files, and
assumed that there was an oral petition.
Now, it is submitted that if the law requires the petition to be so and so,
and a' petition is made to the court, the court is bound to decide whether the
petition is sufficient or not, and. that decision is final and 'binding on all per-
sons until vacated by appeal or other appropriate proceeding. If no petition
at all is presented the court cannot act. It cannot act spontaneously. But
if moved by oral petition when a written petition is required by law, the
court is bound either to grant or deny the petition, to act on it or hold it
insufficient. And power to decide that it is insufficient includes power to
rule that it is sufficient. Power to decide includes power to err. If every
judgment not warranted by law is void, every judgment is void, for it is
then open to all persons at any time to aver and prove that the prior ruling
was unwarranted ',by law or fact. And to conclude further agitation of the
question is the only purpose of any judicial proceeding. To say that the law
forbids the court acting on an oral petition proves nothing; for the same
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law forbids the court to sustain an insufficient written petition, or to sus-
tain a sufficient written petition on insufficient proof. Whether the petition
is sufficient and whether it is sustained by the proof are exclusively within
the province of the trial court, and its decision thereon concludes all persons
till vacated or reversed in some manner recognized by law. In the case of
Windsor v. McVeigh, above cited, Mr. Justice FlIap, of the United States
Supreme Court said, arguendo, "The decree of a court of equity on oral
-allegations, without written pleadings, would be an idle act, of no force be-
yond that of an advisory proceeding of the chancellor." But when the point
became material to the decision of a later case he did not hesitate-to decide
that the form of the pleadings was not jurisdictional He said: "The valid-
ity. of this partition is assailed because no complaint or petition of the ap-
plicant for the partition appears in the record as the foundation of the pro-
ceedings, and without one it is contended that they were void. The statute
does not in terms require the application of the proprietor seeking a parti-
tion to be presented in writing, or if one be presented' to be found among
the records-of the court. * * * When application is made, the court must
consider whether it is by a proper party, and whether it is sufficient in form
and substance. * * * Its order made thereon is an adjudication upon these
matters. * * * This conclusion is not open to collateral attack." Hall v.
Law, io2 U. S. 461. Similar decisions are to be found in many of the states,
including the very court rendering the decision now being reviewed. Kim-
ball v. Brownt, 77 Minn. 167, 7s N. W. io43; Tremble v. Williams, 18 Neb.
x44, 24'N. W. 716; Leach v. Western Ry. Co., 65 N. C. 48.6; Robbins v. Tuffs,
12 R. I. 67; Emerson y. Ross, 17 Fla. 122. See also article in 1o MI CH. LAW
Rxv. 384-391. Clearly the petition is jurisdictional; and just as clearly the
form and sufficiency of it are not jurisdictional.
The last of the recent cases above referred to is Fisher v. Gardnier
(Mich.), 15o N. W. 358, in which the Supreme Court of Michigan, being
equally divided, affirmed a decree quieting title in the complainant, as adopt-
ed daughter and heir of Ira Fisher, against the contentions of the next of
kin of Ira's mother, claiming under 'her will, and contending that the adoptionr
of the complainant was void because the record of the adoption proceedings
did not show that the adoption was with the consent of the principal officer
of the institution in which complainant was then kept as an abandoned child,
nor that J. S., who purported to give such consent had authority to do so,
and that the statute prescribing the practice in adoption proceedings had not
been substantially followed.
Recurring to the enumeration of jurisdictional -facts it is manifest that
if the adoption suit be regarded as a proceeding in personam, jurisdiction in
so far as Ira Fisher was concerned was obtained by virtue of his voluntary
appearance and written petition to the court to decree that the preseit com-
plainant was his adopted child. If the proceeding be regarded as in personam
against the infant, it would seem clear that the recognition of- J. S. as spon-
sor -for -her was a sufficient recognition of J. S. as guardian ad litem of the in-
fant defendant in her custody, admitting for the sake of argument that actual
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appointment of a guardian ad litem is jurisdictional to a proceeding against an
infant actually and physically before the court in a suit instituted before the
court to determine the rights of the infant. See io Ewc. Pr,. & PR. 63o-633;
Langstein Bros. v. O'Brien (i895), io6 Ala. 352, 17 SO. 550, 3o L. R. A. 707.
If the adoption suit be regarded as a suit in rein it is not claimed that the
record indicates absence of the infant, or want of any notice by publication.
Indeed, the record -shows the appearance of J. S., "the only person having the
custody and control of said minor, and lawfully entitled to give consent."
The judges of the supreme court were agreed that there must be substantial
compliance with the requirements of the statute prescribing the procedure
in adoption cases, in order to confer jurisdiction on the court; but differed
as to whether the present record showed substantial compliance. Such has
been the rule in Michigan at least since the case of Greenvault v. Farmers'
and Mechanics' Bank (1847), 2 Douglass 498. The more logical rule, and one
more productive of practical justice, is the one adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that procedure is not jurisdictional, and departures are
waived if not objected to and rectified in the same proceeding. Cooper v.
Reynolds, 77 U. S. 308.
The rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Michigan, that substantial
compliance with all the statutory procedural requirements is jurisdictional,
defeats its own purpose. The more careful the legislature has been to safe-
guard the proceeding, the more certain is it that it will be void. The more
precautions there are to be observed, the greater the probability that one or
more of them will be overlooked or indifferently observed. If it be an ad-
ministrator's sale, an attachment, a partition proceedifig, or any other result-
ing in property being sold, the greater precaution by the legislature to have
notice to all parties and the public, open public bidding, time, place, etc.,
that the property may be safely kept, and well sold, the more certain will the
bidders at the sale be that they are buying only one chance in a dozen or in
a hundred of getting title, and will bid accordingly; and thus a purpose of
protecting the debtors, heirs, etc., produces their ruin. Ample protection to
everyone is secured by enabling them to insist in the proceeding itself that
all requirements be observed, with the privilege of waiving compliance when
it is burdensome rather than beneficial. Disaster only is the fruit of sustaining
collateral attacks. In most instances if the only effect of making objection
were to have the defect amended, the objection would not be thought worth
the making. _ J. R. R
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